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Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen* and James C. Hathaway**
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public powers
IV. Shared responsibility
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Conclusions

Wealthier states have a near-obsession with migration control, spending billions of
dollars each year in the hope of securing their borders.1 Their objective is not, of course, to
prevent the entry of all outsiders. To the contrary, developed states compete to attract those
believed to be able to contribute to their well-being through trade, tourism, and the provision of
labor.2 But the uninvited – including most unskilled and humanitarian migrants – are not
welcome.
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1

In 2012, the United States spent $18 billion on border control. Doris Meissner et al., ‘Immigration Enforcement in
the United States: A formidable machine’, Migration Policy Institute, January 2013. Australia had a budget of
$A1.67 billion for the 2013-14 operational year. Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, ‘Budget
2013/14’, May 2013, p. 101. Combined spending for the 28 EU member states is difficult to compile, but the EU
itself has allocated E1.82 billion between 2007 and 2013 through its External Borders Fund. European Commission,
‘EU Funding for Home Affairs’, April 2011, p. 6.
2

Ayelet Schachar, 'The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes' (2006) 81
NYU Law Review 148-206; Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International
Population Movements in the Modern World, 5th edn (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
-1-

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014

1

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 106 [2014]

Many persons seeking opportunity, safety, or some combination of the two will
nonetheless feel compelled to vote with their feet, often traveling to precisely those more
prosperous and secure states that resist their arrival. The dissonance between their often
powerful human needs and desires and generalized policies of migration control has spawned a
never-ending race between border authorities and ever more inventive human smugglers: for
each loophole closed by officials, two new modes of unauthorized entry seem to emerge.3 And
even if this practical challenge to the developed world’s deterrent agenda could somehow be
answered, there is a second obstacle to the ideal of watertight border control that is the focus of
this article: refugees (and some others) hold a trump card on migration control.4

Under international law, refugees are entitled to arrive of their own initiative, may
not be penalized for unlawful arrival or presence, and must be protected for the duration of risk
in their home country.5 Indeed, refugee status is not “granted” by states at all, but is rather an

3

David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, 2 nd ed (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2011) 81ff ; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds), The
Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration (London: Routledge, 2012).
4

Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees codifies the principle of non-refoulement
pursuant to which states may not return any person – directly or indirectly – to face the risk of being persecuted for a
Convention reason: see generally James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 279-370. Cognate duties of non-refoulement arise under some
other human rights instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1984
Convention Against Torture, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1989 American Convention on
Human Rights and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights: id. at 368-369.

5

The duty of non-penalization is set by Art. 31 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: see
generally James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), at pp. 405-412. The right to remain for the duration of risk follows from Art. 33's
duty of non-refoulement: supra note 4. The required protection for the duration of risk need not occur in the
country to which the refugee travels, but may be fairly shared among state parties: see James C. Hathaway
and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at pp.30-49.
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international status that is simply recognized by them.6 Because a person is a refugee in
consequence of his or her de facto circumstances rather than by virtue of any official validation
of same, border officials will inevitably be confronted by persons legally entitled to the
provisional benefit of the robust duty of non-refoulement as soon as they come under that state’s
jurisdiction. This is, of course, a significant fetter on the permissible scope of migration control
efforts.7

Most confronting of all for destination states, the process of distinguishing a
refugee entitled by law to enter and remain from an ordinary migrant subject to domestic
discretionary rules is not straightforward, usually requiring a careful evaluation of the facts of an
individual’s circumstances in relation to international legal standards. If international law is not
to be breached, the non-citizen who either claims asylum or who is recognizable as coming from
a refugee-producing situation must thus in practice be temporarily admitted pending an
assessment of her status.8 The net result is that what would arguably be the most efficient means
of implementing stringent border controls against the uninvited – a universal policy of
immediate turnbacks of unauthorized non-citizens – is legally foreclosed.

6

On the declaratory nature of refugee status, see Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law
158-159; and UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3,
December 2011, par. 28.
7

That refugees are swept up in generalized deterrent efforts is patently clear, as has been reported in the case of
persons returned by Italy to Libya: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, European Court of Human Rights, Appl. No.
27765/09, 23 February 2012. Nor is it the case that those deterred and sent back to risky situations can be assumed
not to be refugees at all. 94% of asylum claims made in Australia by persons arriving by boat during the short-lived
suspension of deterrent efforts from late 2008 until the end of 2010 were found to be genuine: Verity Edwards, ‘Boat
arrivals almost all get visas’, The Australian, 25 February 2011, available at
www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/boat-arrivals-almost-all-get-visas/story-fn7dlx76-1226011619093.
8

Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 158-159.
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In theory, the developed world could simply withdraw from the refugee law
regime. Whereas the refugee regime once served their interests fairly directly – enabling
European states to avoid instability in the wake of mass influxes of refugees across relatively
porous borders during the early part of the twentieth century, and later giving an international
imprimatur to the sheltering of the enemies of these states’ ideological adversaries after the
Second World War9 – such imperatives no longer exist. There are, however, strong if more
diffuse reasons for the developed world to remain a part of the refugee regime – for example, the
domestic political value of being engaged in a system that systematizes humanitarian
benevolence and an understandable reluctance to unpack a complex system of international law
that supports broader political and economic agendas of value to the industrialized world.10 But
most fundamentally, wealthier states realize the critical symbolic importance of appearing to
remain engaged with the global refugee regime.

Simply put, migratory and other pressures on the developed world are significantly
attenuated by the efforts of the less developed states in which the overwhelming majority of the
world’s refugees now live.11 If the global north were to withdraw entirely from refugee law,

9

The reasons for the development of the refugee law system are discussed in James C. Hathaway, ‘The Evolution
of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950’ (1984) 33 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 348380. See further Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law'
(1966) 3 Journal of Peace Research 278-288; B. S. Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the
South’, (1998) 11 (4) Journal of Refugee Studies 350-374; Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen, ‘Asylum Policy
in the West: Past Trends, Future Possibilities’, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2003/68, September 2003.
10

Alexander Betts and Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise’ (2007) Journal of
Refugee Studies 20 3, 511; Susan Kneebone (ed) The Refugee Convention 50 Years On: Globalization and
International Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003); Kazimierz Bem, ‘The Coming of a 'Blank Cheque' Europe, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol’ (2004) International Journal of Refugee Law 16(4), 609-627.

11

UNHCR, Global Trends 2012: Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge (2013) 2, available from
http://www.unhcr.org/51bacb0f9.html at 10 October 2013.
-4-
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there would be no politically viable basis upon which to insist that poorer countries continue to
shoulder their refugee law obligations under the current system of atomized responsibility and
fluctuating charity from the wealthier world. And if less developed states were to follow suit
and abandon refugee law in the context of continued instability in much of the global south –
producing often massive refugee flows – the negative ramifications for both global security and
economic well-being could be immense. Indeed, with fewer options to find protection close to
home, the logic for refugees of seeking protection farther afield would surely increase – a
scenario that wealthier countries do not wish even to contemplate.

In short, refugee law matters to developed states today for a variety of reasons,
though none more important than that it conscripts less developed countries to act in ways that
provide a critical support to the developed world’s migration control project. Critically, this
more diffuse rationale for continued engagement with refugee law does not require the same
level of hands-on, substantively meaningful implementation of refugee law by powerful states as
was once the case. Developed countries today believe that their interests can be achieved by
means of symbolic, rather than substantive, engagement with refugee law. Whether the goal is to
placate domestic humanitarian constituencies, to avoid the unraveling of the international law
regime, or to be seen to stand shoulder to shoulder with the poorer states that actually make
refugee protection work, optics are at the core of what matters. Powerful states therefore see
value in showing their commitment to refugee law but would prefer – to the greatest extent
possible – to avoid being subject to its practical strictures. In particular, the developed world
does not wish to be faced with the expectation that follows from the duty of non-refoulement,

-5-
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namely that refugees who manage to get to their jurisdiction are entitled to assert protection
claims against them.

This seemingly schizophrenic posture has given rise to the politics of non-entrée.12
Over the last three decades, even as powerful states routinely affirmed their commitment to
refugee law,13 they have worked assiduously to design and implement non-entrée policies that
seek to keep most refugees from accessing their jurisdiction, and thus being in a position to
assert their entitlement to the benefits of refugee law. For many years, visa controls and carrier
sanctions have been instituted to prevent even persons fleeing clearly refugee-producing
countries from reaching the industrialized world by air.14 Airports, harbors, coastlines, and
islands have moreover been declared to be non-territory for purposes of protection

12

This term was first employed in James Hathaway, ‘The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée’ (1992) 91 Refugees 4041. In essence, it suggests that whereas refugee law is predicated on the duty of non-refoulement (that refugees shall
not be turned away), the politics of non-entrée is based on a commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be
allowed to arrive.
13

States have regularly proclaimed their continued for the refugee law regime. UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, 16 January 2002, HCR/MMSP/2001/09; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Ministerial Communiqué, 8 December 2011; Erika Feller, ‘Asylum, migration and refugee protection: realities,
myths and the promise of things to come’, (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 509–36.

14

Frances Nicholson, ‘Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987: Privatising immigration
Functions at the Expense of International Obligations’ (1997) 46 (3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly
586-634; Antonie Cruz, Shifting Responsibility: Carriers' liability in the Member States of the European Union and
North America (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books Limited, 1995).
-6-
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responsibilities.15 And states have resorted to maritime interception on the high seas in a
desperate effort to take deterrent action in a place thought not to attract legal liability.16

The appeal of such non-entrée policies was thought to be the promise of insulating
developed countries from de facto compliance with the duty of non-refoulement even as they left
the duty itself intact. Non-entrée allows wealthier states to insist upon the importance of refugee
protection as a matter of international legal obligation, knowing full well that they themselves
will largely be spared its burdens. It enables a pattern of minimalist engagement under which
the formal commitment to refugee law can be proclaimed as a matter of principle without risk
that the wealthier world will actually be compelled to live up that regime’s burdens and
responsibilities to any serious extent. Non-entrée mechanisms have overall proved highly
effective: the developed world today protects less than 20% of the world’s refugees17 and is
subject to no binding duty even to share the costs of protection in the less developed world,
much less to resettle refugees to their own territories. Whether measured in raw numbers,

15

Tugba Basaran, ‘Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone’ in Peter Burgess and Serge Gutwirth (eds), A
Threat Against Europe: Security, Migration and Integration (Brussels: VUB Press, 2011) 63-74; Mark B. Salter,
‘Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession’, 1 (1) International Political Sociology 2007 49-66;
Frances Nicholson, ‘Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987: Privatising immigration
Functions at the Expense of International Obligations’ 46(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1997
586-634.
16

Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Programme’, (2006) 18 (3/4) International
Journal of Refugee Law 677-696; Susan Kneebone, ‘The Pacific plan: the provision of “effective protection”?’
(2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 696–722; Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Tillman Löhr, ‘Border
Control at Sea: Requirements Under International Human Rights and Refugee Law’ (2009) 21(2) International
Journal of Refugee Law 256-296.
17

Volker Türk, “Address to the 60th Meeting of the UNHCR Standing Committee,” U.N. Doc. EC/65/SC/CRP.101
(July 1, 2014), at 1.
-7-
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refugees per capita, or refugees per dollar of GDP,18 the brutal reality is that the overwhelming
majority of today’s refugees are in – and will remain in – many of the world’s poorest countries.

The politics of non-entrée has thus facilitated a fundamentally duplicitous stance
on the part of the developed world in which the value of refugee law is fervently proclaimed19
even as its practical impact is largely avoided. It is one thing to acknowledge that accidents of
geography mean that the less developed world is likely to continue to be the first port of call for
the majority of the world’s refugees. But it is another thing entirely actively to exacerbate that
maldistribution of responsibility. The duty to protect refugees – if in fact a general international
legal obligation as states have said it is – should be implemented in good faith by all.20 In our
view, it is high time to embark on a more honest discussion about the importance of refugee
protection as a shared responsibility, equitably implemented.

Our goal here is to show that principles of international law have developed in
ways that will facilitate a successful legal challenge to much of the non-entrée infrastructure that
has been assembled by powerful states. Specifically, contemporary understandings of
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and aiding or assisting – taken together – can and should be
invoked in aid of the dismantling of the non-entrée regime. Such legal action will in turn force a

18

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Global Trends 2012: Displacement, The New 21st
Century Challenge, 19 June 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c169d84.html.
19

See note 13 supra.

20

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(1).
-8-
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more honest political conversation about how best to reconceive international refugee protection
as a substantively global responsibility.

To this end, in Part I we describe the politics of non-entrée as it emerged, and as it
has evolved in practice. Simple modes of non-entrée – visa controls, carrier sanctions, and high
seas interdiction – have already proved vulnerable to both practical and legal challenge. They
have thus largely given way to a range of new cooperation-based policies, described in Part II,
the premise of which is to conscript countries of origin and of transit to effect migration control
on behalf of the developed world. The overarching logic of this new generation of non-entrée
policies is to insulate wealthier countries from liability by engaging the sovereignty of another
country. Because the actions that prevent refugees and other persons entitled to international
protection are undertaken by, or under the jurisdiction of, the authorities of other countries,
sponsoring states believe that they can immunize themselves from legal responsibility for the
deterrence. The net result is thus that deterrence is achieved even as liability is avoided.

In truth, these new, cooperation-based non-entrée policies are rarely as “hands off”
as developed states like to suggest. This is because true sub-contracting of deterrence to other
countries would mean that the sponsoring countries have less control, and hence reduced
assurances of success. To minimize the risk of failure, developed states ordinarily become more
directly engaged. We identify a seven-part typology of new generation non-entrée practices
based on the degree of involvement by, or collaboration with, the sponsoring state or states:
reliance on diplomatic relations; the offering of financial incentives; the provision of equipment,
machinery, or training; deployment of officials of the sponsoring state; joint or shared
-9-
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enforcement; assumption of a direct migration control role; and the establishment or assignment
of international agencies to effect interception.

In Parts III, IV, and V we examine in detail the tools of public international law
that we believe can be asserted to challenge this new generation of cooperation-based non-entrée
policies.

Part III looks to developments in the law of jurisdiction. While once anchored
nearly exclusively in notions of territorial control, jurisdiction is now understood also to be
established in some situations in which control is taken over persons outside of a state’s territory,
as well as in some circumstances in which a state exercises public powers outside of its territory.
In our view, the territorial, personal, and public powers approaches to jurisdiction combine to
force accountability for a significantly more extensive range of non-entrée actions than states
believe.

Part IV complements the discussion of jurisdiction by examining the important
evolution of the law of shared responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The “all or
nothing” view under which only one state would be held liable where combined action resulted
in a breach of international human rights law has given way to the possibility of shared
responsibility – not just where jurisdiction is shared, but also where independent actions
combine to produce a common wrong, or where states collaborate to act through a single entity.

-10-
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Part V moves beyond the issue of shared responsibility to examine the situations in
which liability may result from a state aiding or assisting another country to breach international
law. At least where a state sponsoring non-entrée actions is aware that its contributions will lead
to a breach of international law, liability may be established even where that state neither has
jurisdiction nor takes any direct role in the commission of the wrongful act.

In sum, the trio of developments in relation to jurisdiction, shared responsibility,
and aiding or assisting means that states are mistaken in their assumption that international legal
obligations – in particular, to respect the duty of non-refoulement in regard to refugees – are not
enlivened when a state sponsors deterrent actions in some other country. Especially when the
sponsoring state or states engage in more activist roles, it is in our view likely that international
law as it has evolved now affords the basis for holding them liable for breaching the rules of
refugee law they seek to avoid. Law can thus play a critical role in engendering a more
forthright conversation among states about the means by which the burdens and responsibilities
of refugee protection should be shared out.

I. Traditional non-entrée: clearly diminished viability

The practice of non-entrée – comprising efforts by powerful states to prevent
refugees from ever reaching their jurisdiction at which point they become entitled to the benefit
of the duty of non-refoulement and other rights set by the Refugee Convention – have long been
a feature of the refugee protection landscape.

-11-
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In perhaps the earliest incarnation of non-entrée, states subcontracted migration
control to transportation companies. From the early 1980s, the combination of visa controls
(with a visa not being offered for the purpose of seeking refugee protection) and carrier sanctions
(under which those transporting persons without valid visas are subject to significant fines, and
even to having aircraft or other vessels impounded) has compelled airlines and other
transportation companies to effect migration control at the point of departure.21 In practice, both
the employees of the carriers and the private security firms they engage have come to carry out
increasingly elaborate document and immigration checks, thereby denying refugees the right to
travel and hence to advance their claims to protection.22

A second favored form of non-entrée has been to establish so-called “international
zones” – particularly in airports – in which some or all of the legal obligations of the territorial
state are declared not to apply. Indeed, Australia purported to “excise” more than 3,500 islands
from its migration zone in 2001, declaring that it had no protection obligations to any refugee
arriving in these parts of its national territory;23 this policy of excision has now been extended to
the entire mainland of Australia.24 Claiming that the “international zone” is not under the
21

Antonio Cruz, Shifting Responsibility: Carriers' liability in the Member States of the European Union and North
America (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, 1995); Elspeth Guild, ‘The Border Abroad - Visas and Border Controls’
in K. Groenendijk, et al (eds) In Search of Europe's Borders (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 87-104.
22

Frances Nicholson, ‘Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987: Privatising immigration
Functions at the Expense of International Obligations’ (1997) 46 (3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly
586-634; Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility beyond borders’ (2007) 70 Modern Law
Review 598–625; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Private Law Enforcement and Control’ in Gammeltoft-Hansen et
al., eds, The Rights of Others: Essays in honour of Jens Vedsted-Hansen (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2013) 517539.
23

Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act and the Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001.
24

Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013.
-12-
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jurisdiction of the country concerned – as President Putin recently declared when confronted
with the presence of whistle-blower Edward Snowden in the “international zone” of Moscow’s
Sheremetyevo Airport25 – governments have asserted that they are at liberty to act without regard
to refugee and other human rights obligations.

A third traditional form of non-entrée is to effect deterrence on the high seas, an
area that is in fact an international zone. In the 1990s, for example, U.S. Coast Guard ships were
ordered to stop all persons in flight from the violence and persecution that accompanied the
overthrow of the murderous Cedrás dictatorship in Haiti.26 In the years that followed, more than
50,000 Haitians were interdicted in international waters and returned to Haiti without having had
a proper assessment of their claims to be refugees.27 West African states were among those that
followed the American lead, forcibly turning away vessels carrying refugees from their ports.28

Over the past two decades, however, these traditional non-entrée practices have
been successfully challenged, both in practice and as a matter of law.

First, while reliance on the combination of visa controls and carrier sanctions
remains common, this approach may now be less capable of deterring refugees than was once the
25

US whistleblower Snowden 'still in Moscow airport', BBC News Europe, 26 June 2013.

26

Executive Order 12,807 (Kennebunkport Order), 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (1992).

27

Carlos Ortiz Miranda, ‘Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: Refugees, Immigration, and
Foreign Policy’ (1995) 32 San Diego Law Review 673; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law
360.
28

Paul Kuruk ‘Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees: The case of the missing shipload of Liberian
refugees’ (1999) 35 Stanford Journal of International Law 313, 315.
-13-
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case.29 Refugees arriving in the developed world today commonly rely on organized smuggling
and other commercial modes of irregular migration.30 Smugglers have responded to visa
controls and carrier sanctions by adopting increasingly sophisticated technologies to produce
travel documents that are difficult to detect.31 They also secure access for their clients by bribing
border officials and regularly adapting travel routes to exploit new opportunities for entry.32 The
vulnerability of the visa control and carrier sanction regime has thus given rise to an unending
“cat and mouse game” in which border control must be constantly reinvented to respond to the
schemes hatched by imaginative smugglers motivated by extraordinary profits.

Second, the notion that a state can delimit the geographical scope of its territory for
purposes of avoiding legal liability – for example, by excision or the declaration of an
international zone in an airport – has simply been rejected. Responding to efforts by France to
declare Orly Airport an “international zone” in which duties of protection do not apply, the
European Court of Human Rights in Amuur concluded succinctly that “[d]espite its name, the

29

Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen (eds), The Migration Industry; Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age
of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003).

30

David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2011).

31

Marika McAdam and Sebastian Baumeister, Migrants smuggling by air, United Nations Offices on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) Issue Paper (2010); Ulla D. Berg and Carla Tamagno, ‘Migration brokers and document fixers:
The making of migrant subjects in urban Peru’ in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen (eds), The Migration
Industry, pp. 190-214.

32

Marika McAdam and Sebastian Baumeister, Migrants smuggling by air, United Nations Offices on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) Issue Paper (2010), 13; Rosales Sandoval, ‘Public officials and the migration industry in
Guatemala: Greasing the wheels of a corrupt machine’ in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen (eds), The Migration
Industry; Jørgen Carling, ‘Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders’ (2007) 41(2)
International Migration Review 316–343; Ko-Lin Chin, ‘The Social Organization of Chinese Human Smuggling’ in
Kyle and Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling : Comparative Perspectives, 186-203.
-14-
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international zone does not have extraterritorial status.”33 More recently, the High Court of
Australia struck down a law providing that persons arriving on an “excised” Australian island
were precluded from accessing Australian courts and the usual procedures for assessment of
refugee status.34 As these judgments make clear, both the nature of state territory at international
law and the overarching duty to meet standards of fairness wherever there is an exercise of state
power means that “international zones” are not capable of insulating a state from its legal
obligations to protect refugees under its jurisdiction.

Third, there is little support for the view that a state can deter refugees in the
international space of the high seas without violating its duties of protection. The outlier case is
the 1993 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Sale35 in which the Court
engaged in highly formalist and decontextualized reasoning to find that a refugee cannot be
“returned” by an asylum state to her home country if she has yet to arrive in the asylum state,
and that a purely territorial scope for the duty of non-refoulement is required by the language of
its national security exception.36 The Court purported to draw on the Convention’s travaux
préparatoires to justify its reasoning,37 prompting the American representative to the specialist

33

Amuur v. France, European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 19776/92. 25 June 1996, par. 52.

34

Plaintiff M61 and Plaintiff M69 v. Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41, 11 November 2010.

35

Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Haitian Center Council, United States
Supreme Court. 113 S.Ct. 2549, 509 US 155.
36

Ibid par. 180, Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention states: ‘The benefit of the present provision may not,
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.’
37

Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Haitian Center Council, United States
Supreme Court. 113 S.Ct. 2549, 509 US 155, par. 178.
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committee that drafted the Refugee Convention to reply that it would be “incredible that states
that had agreed not to force any human being back into the hands of his/her oppressors intended
to leave themselves – and each other – free to reach out beyond their territory to seize a refugee
and to return him/her to the country from which he sought to escape.”38

Happily, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach has not found favor elsewhere. It was
rejected by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,39 which adopted the contrary
position advanced by the UNHCR in its brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.40 The English Court of
Appeal chose to treat Sale as “wrongly decided; it certainly offends one’s sense of fairness.”41
And in the recent case of Hirsi,42 a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
determined unanimously that push-backs on the high seas were in breach of regional nonrefoulement obligations.43 In a separate opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque pointedly observed
that “the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation contradicts the literal and ordinary
meaning of Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention and departs from the common rules of
treaty interpretation.”44

38

Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, (1993) 5 American Society of International Law Newsletter 1.

39

Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States (‘US Interdiction of Haitians on the High Seas’). InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.95 7 rev. 13 March
1997, par. 156-158.

40

UNHCR, 'Brief Amicus Curiae: The Haitian Interdiction Case 1993' (1994) 6 (1) International Journal of
Refugee Law 85-102.

41

R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. Court of Appeal. [2003]
EWCA Civ 666, 20 May 2003, par. 34; rev’d. on other grounds at [2004] UKHL 55.

42

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, European Court of Human Rights, Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012.

43

Ibid par. 134-5.

44

Separate opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque to Hirsi v. Italy, ibid 42, par. 70.
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In sum, the classic tools of non-entrée no longer provide developed states with an
effective and legal means to avoid their obligations under refugee law.

II. Cooperation-based non-entrée: the next generation

With the viability of traditional forms of non-entrée compromised, powerful states
have embraced a new generation of deterrent regimes intended to overcome many of the
weaknesses of the original generation of non-entrée practices. The new approaches are
predicated on international cooperation, with deterrence occurring in the territory, or under the
jurisdiction, of the home state or a transit country. As a practical matter, new forms of nonentrée often include action in states of origin or transit designed to disrupt migrant smuggling
networks, thereby stymying travel toward the frontiers of developed states. This geographical
reorientation is also thought to be legally instrumental. Even as international law has evolved to
make clear that liability under the non-refoulement norm ensues for actions taken by a state at its
own borders and in any other place under its jurisdiction,45 it is assumed that actions undertaken
under the jurisdiction of the authorities of other countries are legally risk-free.46 With poorer
states of origin and transit often willing for economic, political, and other reasons to serve as the
gatekeepers to the developed world,47 developed countries believe that they can insulate
45

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum 94-99; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 160-

173.
46

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum 21 and 126.

47

Sandra Lavenex, ‘Shifting up and out: The foreign policy of European immigration control’, (2006) 29 (2) West
European Politics 329-350; Andrew Geddes, ‘Migration as foreign policy? The external dimension of EU action on
migration and asylum’, SIEPS Report 2009:2, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2009, 33; Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Outsourcing migration management: EU, power, and the external dimension of asylum and
immigration policy’, DIIS Working Paper 2006/1, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006; Elizabeth Guild,
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themselves from liability for refugee deterrence by having such action take place under the
sovereign authority of another country.

One of the first such initiatives was undertaken by the United States in 1997. Its
Operation Global Reach provided for the ongoing presence of U.S. immigration officers in
several Central American and Caribbean countries to work with local authorities to effect
migration control operations.48 In 2001, Australia’s “Pacific Solution” saw that country woo the
island state of Nauru with offers of free medical care, educational opportunities, and sports ovals
in return for the warehousing in Nauru of migrants intercepted by Australia.49 That deal was the
genesis for outreach to other neighboring states, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea,
intended to prevent boats carrying migrants from traveling towards Australia.50 And
commencing in 2006, Spain and Italy struck deals with African countries to carry out maritime

‘What is a neighbour? Examining the EU neighbourhood policy from the perspective of movement of persons’,
paper presented at Western NIS Forum for Refugee-Assisting NGOs, Yalta, 1–3 June 2005; J. Niessen and Y.
Schibel, ‘International migration and relations with third countries: European and US approaches’, MPG Occasional
Paper, Migration Policy Group, Berlin, May 2004.
48

Jonathan M. Winer, “Operation Global Reach News Conference”, Federal News Service, 19 June 1997; David
Kyle and Rey Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2011) 65.

49

Tara Magner, ‘The Less than 'Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’, 16 International Journal of
Refugee Law (2004) 53-90.
50

In July 2013 Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia signed a bilateral agreement to process and resettle an
uncapped number of asylum seekers in PNG, to be funded by Australia but administered by PNG. As well as
funding the entire arrangement, Australia announced a suite of additional development assistance programs to the
developing state. Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea, signed in Brisbane
19 July 2013; Helen Brown, Indonesia to change visa requirements for Iranians entering the country following
request from PM Kevin Rudd, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 19 July 2013. Available at
www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-18/indonesia-to-change-visa-requirements-for-iranians/4829434.
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interdiction within their territorial waters.51 Italy went so far as to promise Libya’s Muammar
Gaddafi $5 billion if he would set up radar detection facilities on his country’s shores and work
with Italy to prevent the departure from Libya of unauthorized migrants.52

Indeed, these bilateral and ad hoc arrangements have now spawned a series of
more comprehensive arrangements. Under the American-led Merida Initiative,53 the Bali
Process financed by Australia,54 and the European Union’s “external dimension,”55 developed
states are crafting regional platforms that embed asylum and migration questions into the
mainstream of their foreign policy.

The diversity of the new approaches of cooperation-based non-entrée is
astonishing, ranging from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint operations to effect

51

Aderanti Adepoju et al, ‘Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A
Critical Review’, 48 (3) International Migration (2010) 42–75; Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich, Migration
after the Arab Spring, Migration Policy Centre Research Report 2012/09, September 2012; Michela Ceccorulli,
‘‘Securitizing’ Migration Crises: The European Union, North Africa and Transatlantic Regional Cooperation’ in
Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed), Regions and Crises: New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalisms (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 126-44; Maarten den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2012) 223-7.

52

The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya was signed on 30 August 2008
and entered into force on 2 March 2009. Cooperation under the treaty was halted in March 2011 following the
NATO bombing campaign. See further Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return
of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, New York, September
2009, 24.
53

A multi-year agreement between the United States and Central America to combat drug smuggling, transnational

crime and illegal. US Department of State, ’The Merida Initiative’, Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida;
Isabella A. Vaughne (ed), The Merida Initiative: U. S. Counterdrug and Anticrime Assistance for Mexico (New
York: Nova Science, 2010).
54

Susan Kneebone, ‘The Bali Process and Global Refugee Policy in the Asia–Pacific Region’ (2014) Journal of
Refugee Studies 27(2).
55

Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, SI (1999) 800, 15-16 October 1999; Christina Boswell,
'The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy' (2003) 79 International Affairs 619-638.
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migration control. We observe seven main typologies, which may be implemented separately or
in tandem.

The first and most basic new form of non-entrée relies on diplomatic relations.
Both sticks (such as withholding development assistance) and carrots (including trade
agreements, visa facilitation, and labor immigration quotas) may be provided to states of origin
or transit willing to assist in the deterrence of outward migration. The European Union has been
especially active in promoting this approach, seeking to negotiate agreements with key
Mediterranean and Eastern European states to combat “irregular” migration,56 including by the
establishment or intensification of exit controls.57 States under consideration for accession to the
European Union are moreover required to meet detailed migration control standards set by the
European Commission as a condition to move forward in the process of securing actual
membership in the Union.58

A second new approach to non-entrée is to move beyond diplomatic cooperation to
provide partner states of origin and transit with direct financial incentives to take on migration
control responsibilities deemed of value. Under the Mérida Initiative, for example, the United

56

Aderanti Adepoju et al, ‘Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A
Critical Review’ 48 (3) International Migration (2010) 42–75. Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Policing Migration in the
Mediterranean’ (2006) 11(1) Mediterranean Politics 59-82. Ivaylo Gatev, ‘Border Security in the Eastern
Neighbourhood: Where Biopolitics and Geopolitics Meet’ (2008) 13 European Affairs Review 97-116.

57

Aderanti Adepoju et al, ‘Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A
Critical Review’ 48 (3) International Migration (2010) 42–75.
58

Rosemary Byrne et al, New Asylum Countries? Migration control and refugee protection in an Enlarged
European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). As documented by Byrne et al the requirements
placed on accession states before the 2004 enlargement in some respects exceeded the obligations placed on existing
Member States.
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States has since 2008 appropriated some $2.1 billion to combat drug smuggling and improve
border control in Mexico and Central America.59 Part of this funding has been used to purchase
equipment, including helicopters and x-ray scanners,60 as well as to open new immigration
control sites at the border between Mexico and Guatemala.61 Similarly, in 2003 Spain agreed to
provide Morocco with $390 million in aid and debt relief in return for Moroccan border control
efforts.62 In 2009, Italy pledged $5 billion to Libya over a 20-year period in exchange for Libya
agreeing to take back intercepted refugee and other migrants and to undertake patrols intended to
prevent migration towards Europe.63

Beyond offering financial incentives, a third variant of the new non-entrée is
directly to provide equipment, machinery, and training to the authorities of the cooperating
country. Italy and other European Union countries provided Libya with border control

59

US Department of State, ’The Merida Initiative’, Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida. See further
Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke, Mérida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug
Assistance for Mexico and Central America, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2008; Clare Ribando
Seelke, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, Congressional Research
Service, Washington DC, 2009.
60

Clare Ribando Seelke, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues,
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2009, p. 4.
61

Ibid, p. 11.

62

Liza Schuster, The Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper
No. 20, 2005, 13; Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘The Human Cost of Border Control’ (2007) 9 European Journal of
Migration and Law 127-139. As a result of this cooperation Moroccan gendarmes ended up opening fire on migrants
trying to climb the border-fence to the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla killing 11 and wounding many others in
September 2005.
63

Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya, 30 August 2008, entry into force 2
March 2009. The treaty was ratified by Italy in Law no.7/2009 and published in Official Gazette no. 40 of 18
February 2009. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Outsourcing European Migration Control and the Reach of
International Refugee Law’ in Paul Minderhoud and Elspeth Guild (eds), Citizens and Third Country Nationals:
Examining Ten Years of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, A Celebration of Ten Years of the
European Journal of Migration and Law (The Hague: Brill, 2011).
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equipment – including radars, night vision goggles, and patrol boats.64 European-funded security
companies have provided document scanners and thermo-imaging equipment to facilitate
immigration control along the border between Russia and the Ukraine.65 Australia and Indonesia
established a joint center to improve border control and law enforcement capability in Jakarta in
2004;66 Australia also trains Sri Lankan naval officers and has gifted patrol boats and other
border control equipment to the country.67 In 2010, Mexican officials were invited to the United
States for a ten-week training program on profiling techniques and the detection of false
documents.68

A fourth form of collaborative deterrence is actually to deploy or second
immigration officials of the destination country to work with authorities in the country of origin
or transit. For example, the United States maintains immigration officers in 47 foreign

64

Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Private Security Companies and the European Borderscapes’ in Gammeltoft-Hansen
and Sørensen (eds), The Migration Industry; Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Policing Migration in the Mediterranean’ (2006)
11(1) Mediterranean Politics 59-82.
65

Ivaylo Gatev, ‘Border Security in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Where Biopolitics and Geopolitics Meet’ (2008)
13 European Affairs Review 97-116.
66

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, A return on investment: The future of police cooperation between Australia
and Indonesia, Special Report, March 2014. The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Information
available at www.jclec.com.
67

Human Rights Law Centre, ‘Can’t flee, can’t stay: Australia’s interception of Sri Lankan asylum-seekers’, March
2014. Available at http://www.hrlc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/HRLC_SriLanka_Report_11March2014.pdf.
68

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) press release, ‘DHS, ICE and Mexico honor graduates of Mexican
Customs Investigator Training Program: Mexican Customs officials embrace learning ICE investigative and crimefighting techniques’, 22 October 2010. Available at www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/101022northcharleston2.htm.
See generally Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case,
Migration Policy Institute, April 2011.
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countries.69 Australia began posting Airline Immigration Officers (ALOs) in Bangkok in 1990,70
and by 2013 had an ALO network of 15 offices.71 In 2004, the European Union established a
network of immigration officers drawn from member states to be posted at airports and border
crossing points in key states of origin and transit.72 While both Australia and the European
Union are at pains to emphasize that their immigration officers “do not carry out any tasks
relating to the sovereignty of States,”73 in practice the “advice” or “support” of their officers is
often decisive for decisions regarding onward travel.74

Fifth, a program of joint or shared enforcement may be established between the
destination country and partner states of origin and/or transit. U.S. immigration officers carried
out joint operations with Mexican authorities,75 leading to some 74,000 apprehensions of U.S.-

69

Eleanor Taylor Nicholson, Cutting Off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent Migration, Berkeley Law
Issues Brief, 2011, 5; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Overview, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/.
70

Savitri Taylor, ‘Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power Without Responsibility?’
in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 93-127 at 95.
71

Ibid; At 30 June 2013. Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report 2012-13, 302. Available at
http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2012-13/pdf/2012-13-diac-annual-report.pdf. On the role of ALOs see
further Leanne Weber, ‘Policing the virtual border: punitive preemption in Australian offshore migration control’
(2007), 34 Social Justice, 77-93.

72

Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison network.

73

Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and
Trafficking of Human Beings in the European Union, 6621/1/02, 27 February 2002; Australia, Department of
Immigration and Border Protection, ‘Combating People Smuggling and Unauthorised Arrivals’, 16 Dec. 2013,
available at https://www.immi.gov.au/managing-australias-borders/border-security/irregular-entry/combat.htm#e .
74

Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility beyond borders’, (2007) 70 Modern Law Review
598–625; Savitri Taylor, ‘Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power Without
Responsibility?’ in McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security, 93-127 at 103.
75

Matthew Coleman, ‘A Geopolitics of Engagement: Neoliberalism, the War on Terrorism, and the
Reconfiguration of US Immigration Enforcement’ (2007) 12 Geopolitics 607-634.
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bound immigrants between 1997 and 2001.76 Australian officials fund and work closely with
their Sri Lankan counterparts to foil human smuggling efforts in the hope of deterring onward
movement towards Australia.77 Since 2010, border guards of 24 European Union states have
been deployed to the border between Greece and Turkey to prevent entry into Greece,78 and thus
into the Union’s territory. Spain has brought Senegalese and Mauritanian immigration officers
onboard vessels engaged in interception of outbound migrants from the territorial waters of those

76

Ibid 620.

77

Australian Customs and Border Protection Services brief, Attorney-General’s meeting with His Excellency
Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe. Available at www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2013003135_DocumentsReleased.pdf; Australian High Commission in Sri Lanka media release, ‘Sri Lankan convicted of
people smuggling’, 14 September 2011; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia in the Asian Century
Sri Lanka profile. Available at https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/asian-century/downloads/sri-lanka.pdf.
Phil Lynch, ‘Sri Lanka, human rights and foreign policy in a tweet’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 21 July
2011; Ben Doherty, ‘More Sri Lankan navy sailors suspected of people smuggling’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16
November 2013; ABC News, ‘Australia to donate navy boats to Sri Lanka in people smuggling deal’, Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 17 November 2013. In December 2012, the first Sri Lanka-Australia Joint Working
Group on People Smuggling and Transnational Crime was convened. See Department of Immigration and
Citizenship, Annual Report 2012-13, 10. Available at http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/201213/pdf/2012-13-diac-annual-report.pdf.

78

Regulation (EC) No 863/2007, Establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border 78 Intervention Teams,
11 July 2007; Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera, Joint Operation RABIT 2010 – FRONTEX Assistance to Greece’s
Border with Turkey: Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System, Centre for European Policy
Studies, 22 November 2010, available at
http://ceps.be/book/‘joint-operation-rabit-2010’-–-frontex-assistance-greece’s-border-turkey-revealing-deficiencies.
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states.79 Such “ship-rider agreements” have also been entered into between Italy and Albania,80
and between the United States and the Dominican Republic.81

In a sixth and still more intrusive form of non-entrée, the destination country may
actually take on a direct migration control role from within the territory of the cooperating state.
In 2001, the United Kingdom introduced a pre-clearance procedure at Prague Airport under
which British immigration officers stationed there had the authority to grant or refuse leave to
enter the United Kingdom before boarding.82 As was made clear in evidence considered by the
House of Lords, a significant number of Roma seeking recognition of their refugee status were
in fact deterred by this procedure.83 Agreements have also been signed to allow third country
authorities onboard European ships to carry out interceptions inside the territorial waters of such

79

Frontex, ‘Longest Frontex-coordinated operation – HERA, the Canary Islands’, news release, 19 December 2006,
available at http://frontex.europa.eu; Sergio Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy FRONTEX and the
Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working
Document No. 261/March 2007, 21; J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the Management
of the External Border of the European Union, Doctoral dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2009,
341-2. See further Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) 219.

80

Protocol Between Italy and Albania to Prevent Certain Illegal Acts and Render Humanitarian Assistance to Those
Leaving Albania, 2 April, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, No. 163, 15 July 1997. See further Guilfoyle,
Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea 210.

81

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Dominican
Republic Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Migration Law Enforcement 2003, KAV 6187; Guilfoyle, Shipping
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea 196.
82

R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. Court of Appeal, [2003]
EWCA Civ 666, 20 May 2003; rev’d. on other grounds at [2004] UKHL 55. See also Andrew Brouwer and Judith
Kumin, ‘Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide’, (2003) Refuge 21.
83

European Roma Rights Centre and others v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another [2004], UKHL
55, 9 December 2004, pars. 4, 92.
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states as Libya, Mauritania, and Senegal.84 While relevant European Union guidelines make
express reference to the importance of respect for the duty of non-refoulement,85 interdicted
persons have in practice often been returned without any assessment of their protection needs.86

Finally, we are now seeing the emergence of a seventh approach to non-entrée in
which international agencies are tasked by developed states with the responsibility to intercept
refugees and other would-be migrants while they are still under the jurisdiction of countries of
origin and of transit. The European Union border agency, Frontex, has traditionally served as an
umbrella organization to enable member states to carry out joint operations at the external
borders of the Union and internationally.87 The agency has, however, recently been authorized
to deploy its own immigration officers to third states, as well as to “initiate and carry out joint
operations.”88 While the agency’s mandate requires it to respect duties under the Refugee
Convention, in particular the duty of non-refoulement,89 it is doubtful that as a matter of
international law the agency itself can be said to be truly bound by any international human

84

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum 126; Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea 218; Jorrit J.
Rijpma, ‘Building borders: the regulatory framework for the management of the external border of the European
Union’, doctoral dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2009.
85

Council of the European Union, Regulation No 1168/2011amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union, arts 1 and 3(b).
86

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum 126; Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea 218.
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Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 26 October 2004.
88

Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union, 25 October 2011, Art. 3.
89

Ibid Art. 1(2).
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rights instrument.90 As such, the shift in the Frontex mandate raises the specter of a legally
unaccountable entity deterring refugee and other migration in foreign space.

To be clear, the seven variants of cooperation-based non-entrée identified here are
in no sense hermetically sealed options. For example, the Libyan-Italian interdiction scheme
included not only financial incentives, but also comprised direct provision of border control
equipment and joint enforcement operations in Libyan territorial waters.91

The truly pernicious nature of these new forms of non-entrée is especially clear
when the cooperation is with countries not themselves legally bound to protect refugees. Neither
Libya nor Indonesia, for example, is a party to the Refugee Convention.92 And even when
formally bound by refugee law, many of the favored partner states have no national procedure in
place to assess refugee status or the de facto capacity to or will to ensure respect for refugee

90

International refugee law (and most general human rights law) is addressed exclusively to states. Adjudicatory
jurisdiction over international organizations thus cannot be established: Behrami and Behrami v. France and
Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 71412/01 and 78166/01. 2
May 2007 (Admissibility). The planned accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights may partly remedy this situation.
91

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Outsourcing European Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee
Law’ in Paul Minderhoud and Elspeth Guild (eds), Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Examining Ten Years of
the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. A Celebration of Ten Years of the European Journal of Migration
and Law (The Hague: Brill, 2011).
92

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, as of 1 April 2011. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html.
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rights.93 As such, refugees trapped under the jurisdiction of these states have little or no ability
to claim the rights to which they are in principle entitled by international law.

The question to which we now turn is whether the assumptions upon which this
new generation of cooperative non-entrée mechanisms is based are legally sound. Specifically,
we argue that the bedrock principle of public international law that state responsibility follows
from jurisdiction can no longer be narrowly understood. While primarily territorial in nature,
jurisdiction today can also be established in some situations in which control is taken over
persons outside of a state’s territory, as well as in some circumstances in which a state exercises
public powers outside of its territory. Nor is it the case that only one state can have jurisdiction
in a given factual context. To the contrary, principles of shared responsibility provide a critical
means by which to hold sponsoring states accountable for many forms of joint or collective
conduct at the heart of the new generation of non-entrée. And even where there is no
jurisdiction – particularized or shared – a more robust understanding of liability for aiding or
assisting another country to breach international law is evolving that we believe has the potential
to fill at least some of the accountability void that non-entrée policies seek to exploit. Taken
together, developments in relation to jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding
and assisting significantly challenge the legality of many of the new, international cooperationbased deterrent regimes.
93

For example, while Libya is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention, it is bound by the 1969 Organization of
African Unity Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
Against Torture; the non-refoulement principle is moreover formally incorporated in its national law: Article 2, Law
20/1991. Despite these commitments, Libya has yet to implement a functional asylum system, and has a track
record of abuse, detention and forced return of refugees. Amnesty International, Seeking Safety, Finding Fear:
Refugee, asylum-seekers and migrants in Libya and Malta, Reg 01/004/2010, London, December 2010); Human
Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s
Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, New York, September 2009.
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III. Jurisdiction in evolution

Unlike most other human rights instruments, the rights contained in the 1951
Refugee Convention are not granted en bloc, but rather incrementally, requiring states gradually
to extend more generous rights as the degree of attachment between the refugee and host state
increases.94 While the majority of rights are explicitly reserved for refugees who are physically
present in the territory or who have some higher level of attachment to the host state, a few core
rights – including the duty of non-refoulement – are intentionally said to apply without territorial
or other qualification.95 The plain language of the Convention thus makes clear that this critical
group of baseline rights is not acquired only when a refugee reaches a state party’s territory96 –
this being the requirement to qualify for rights that are acquired at the second level of attachment
(“in” or “within” a contracting state’s territory). While at no time did the drafters suggest that
state parties were responsible to effectuate refugee rights in the world at large, neither did they
purport to exempt states that choose to act beyond their territory from responsibility for the
consequences of such actions. In view of this ambiguity – plain language makes clear that some
refugee rights are not limited to refugees physically present in a state party’s territory, yet neither
are state parties compelled by the treaty to implement rights in the world at large – rules of treaty
94

Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, pp. 161-63. The notion of “levels of attachment” was approved by the UK
Supreme Court in R. (ST, Eritrea) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 12 (Mar. 21, 2012),
at [2].
95

In addition to Art. 33's protection against refoulement, these rights include non-discrimination (Art. 3), property
(Art. 13), access to the courts (Art. 16(1)), to benefit from rationing schemes (Art. 20), education (Art. 22), fiscal
equality (Art. 29), and ability to apply for a durable status (Art. 34).Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, pp. 160-71.
96

As noted by the House of Lords, ‘the starting point of the construction exercise must be the text of the
Convention itself... because it expresses what the parties to it have agreed”: Januzi and Hamid v. SSHD, [2006]
UKHL 5 (U.K.H.L., Feb. 15, 2006, per Lord Bingham). See further Saadi v. United Kingdom. European Court of
Human Rights. Appl. No. 13229/03. 29 January 2008, paras. 61-2; Golder v. United Kingdom. European Court of
Human Rights. Appl. No. 4451/70. 21 February 1975, par. 29.
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interpretation compel the adoption of an understanding of the first, ambiguously framed level of
attachment that is in line with the context, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention.97

These considerations lead us to seek guidance in the approach taken by
international human rights law – expressly part of the Convention’s context by virtue of its
Preamble,98 and an appropriate touchstone in view of the holdings of leading courts that the
object and purpose of refugee law is to provide for the surrogate or substitute protection of
human rights.99 Under international human rights law, the usual baseline position100 is that rights
are owed to anyone “within” or “subject to” a state’s jurisdiction.101 Adopting the same
approach for acquisition of the most basic refugee rights (that is, those that are not qualified by
references to physical presence or otherwise) – including, of course, the duty of non-refoulement

97

1969 Vienna Convention Relating to the Interpretation of Treaties Art. 33(3)c. As noted by the International
Court of Justice, ‘interpretation cannot remain unaffected by subsequent development of law… an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of
the interpretation.’ Namibia (South West Africa) Case. International Court of Justice. 26 January 1971, p. 31. Both
national and international jurisprudence have further emphasised the importance of interpreting the Refugee
Convention as a ‘living instrument’ affected by subsequent legal developments. F. Nicholson and V. Türk, ‘Refugee
protection in international law: an overview’, in E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 37-38.
98

See for example Suresh v Canada, Canadian Supreme Court,1 SCR 3, 11 January 2002; Hathaway, The Rights of
Refugees Under International Law 64.
99

James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status , 2 nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), at pp. 184-185.
100

The four Geneva Conventions are exceptional, expressly obligating state parties “to respect and to ensure respect
for the present Convention in all circumstances (emphasis added)”: [Art.1].
101

See notably the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1984 Convention Against Torture,
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1989 American Convention on Human Rights and the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights. See further Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, pp 64-66; Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Access to Asylum, pp. 81-93.
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– is thus contextually logical as well as purposively sound, a fact recognized by soft law102 and
confirmed by dominant state practice.103

In one of the clearest statements of the meaning of jurisdiction in international
human rights law, the UN Human Rights Committee determined that the obligation under the
Civil and Political Covenant to respect rights “within [a state’s] territory and subject to its
jurisdiction” means that

[a] State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of the State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.104

This approach was affirmed as accurate by the International Court of Justice in the seminal
Israeli Wall decision, which insisted that

... the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape
from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their
national territory.105

102

See e.g. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 74 (XLV) 1994, para. (g), and No. 97 (LIV) 2003, para.

(a).
103

Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, pp 68-74; Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, pp. 72-81. The U.S.
government represents a notable exception to this position and maintains that Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention applies strictly territorially. United States Mission to the United Nations and Other International
Organizations in Geneva, Observations of the United States on the Advisory Opinion of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, (28 December 2007).
104

UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation
imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, par. 10.
105

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion.
International Court of Justice. General List No. 131. 9 July 2004, par. 109. See also Democratic Republic of Congo
v. Uganda, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, at [216], finding that international human rights law is “applicable in respect of acts
done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”
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Some confusion was, however, sewn by the subsequent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in Bankovic.106 Invoking general principles of international law107 to
interpret the scope of jurisdiction for purposes of entitlement to human rights protection, the
Court determined that extensions beyond territorial jurisdiction108 are “... exceptional and
requir[e] special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.”109 Finding no such
special justification to exist in regard to the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO states, the Court
ruled that the states conducting the bombing had no jurisdiction over the civilians killed, and
thus did not breach the European Convention despite effecting their deaths.

In recent years, however, the open-ended language about the meaning of
jurisdiction adopted in the Bankovic decision has been built upon in a way that brings European
regional human rights law to a position on the meaning of jurisdiction that is substantially in line
with that adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee and affirmed by the International Court
of Justice.110 As the critical 2011 ruling in Al-Skeini makes clear, while the concept of

106

Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others Application No. 52207/99, 12 December 2001.

107

Ibid., at para. 59. As a matter of public international law, a state’s jurisdiction normally denotes its entitlement
to prescribe and enforce its domestic laws, and the notion of jurisdiction has therefore – at least in regard to
enforcement – traditionally been linked to state territory: Simma, Bruno, and Andreas Th. Müller. 2012. Exercise
and limits of jurisdiction. In The Cambridge Companion to International Law, edited by J. Crawford and M.
Koskenniemi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 134-57 at 135; Lowe, Vaughan. 2006. Jurisdiction. In
International Law, 2nd edition, edited by M. D. Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 335-360 at 338.
108

As pointed out by the International Court of Justice, ’while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it
may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.’ Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion. International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004, para. 109.
109

Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 5207/99. 12
December 2001, par. 61. This has since been reiterated in several judgments, see e.g. Al-Skeini and Others v. United
Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011, par. 131
110

Supra
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jurisdiction remains in evolution, states today exercise human rights jurisdiction beyond their
territory in an increasing number of situations.111

The first such situation is where a state exercises effective control over some or all
of the territory of another country, most notably by way of military occupation.112 The
jurisdictional obligations of the occupying state stem from de facto control alone113 – lawfulness
is not required.114 What matters is that the state is adjudged to exercise overall control of a
defined territory for some period of time, and to the exclusion of the territorial state.115 For
example, the International Court of Justice held in its Wall opinion that Israel’s human rights
obligations apply to “all conduct by the State party’s authorities or agents in [the Occupied]
territories that affect the enjoyment of rights... and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of

111

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011

112

Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 52207/99. 12
December 2001, par. 71. Other cases involving effective control over territory include Loizidou v. Turkey. European
Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 15318/89. 18 December 1996; Coard et al. v United States. Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Case 10.951. 29 September 1999; Salas and Others v. the United States (‘US
military intervention in Panama’). Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. Case No. 10.573, Report No.
31/93, Annual Report IACHR 1993, 312. 14 October 1993; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion. International Court of Justice. General List No. 131. 9 July 2004,
par. 102-114.
113

Dinstein, Yoram. 2009. The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p. 35.
114

As is also the case under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the lawfulness of such military operations is in
principle irrelevant to the obligations imposed on the occupying power. Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Art. 2. This was specifically confirmed in Hirsi,
noting that ’responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action - whether
lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory’. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.
Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012, par. 73.
115

Dinstein, International Law of Beliggerent Occupation, pp. 38-9.
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Israel under the principles of public international law.”116 Much the same result was reached by
the European Court of Human Rights in Cyprus v. Turkey, finding that responsibility followed
not simply because relevant actions had been taken by government agents, but more generally
from the fact of a relevant act or omission having taken place within an area of effective
control.117

This first, control-based extension of the notion of the traditional territorial view of
jurisdiction is, however, likely of little immediate value in contesting the new generation of
cooperation-based non-entrée practices. Not only has the case law thus far focused only on
obligations arising from military occupation, but to date there is no instance of non-entrée
having been implemented by way of the transfer of durable and exclusive control over
territory.118 In contrast, we see real potential in two other developments in the law of
jurisdiction: jurisdiction based on the exercise of authority over individuals, for example by way
of arrest or detention; and jurisdiction established by the exercise abroad of public powers
abroad as a matter of treaty or other agreement.

A. Jurisdiction based on authority over individuals

116

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion.
International Court of Justice. General List No. 131. 9 July 2004, par. 110.
117

Cyprus v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 25781/94. 10 May 2001, par. 77.

118

The closest approximation may be the agreement under which the United Kingdom is allowed to enforce its
national immigration law within designated areas of the French ports of Dunkirk, Boulogne and Calais. At the
international level, the juxtaposed control scheme is provided for by the Touquet treaty, which was signed on 4
February 2003, and given domestic effect by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed
Controls). Similar control arrangements have been made to give access to United Kingdom immigration officers to
perform migration control at Eurostar stations in France and Belgium.
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Short of exercising territorial control, “a State may also be held accountable for
violation of... rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who
are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating –
whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State.”119 States have, for example, been found to
have jurisdiction over individuals within their embassy or consulate, or who are onboard craft or
vessels registered in their country, or which are flying their flag.120 It is also acknowledged that
a state has jurisdiction over individuals held on its military bases, detention centers or other
closed facilities controlled by the extraterritorially acting state.121

Such findings are, at one level, unsurprising: they simply mirror the traditional
approach in public international law to the scope of enforcement jurisdiction. But the European
Court of Human Rights has gone farther, finding human rights jurisdiction to be established even
by the simple act of boarding a migrant vessel, the emphasis being placed in such cases on the de

119

Issa and Others v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 31821/96. 16 November 2004, par. 71.

120

Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 52207/99. 12
December 2001, par. 73, and Medvedyev and Others v. France. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No.
3394/03. 29 March 2010, par. 65. See in general X. v. Federal Republic of Germany. European Commission on
Human Rights. Appl. No. 1611/62. 25. September 1965; X v. United Kingdom. European Commission of Human
Rights. Appl. No. 7547/76. 15 December 1977; W.M. v. Denmark. European Commission of Human Rights. Appl.
No. 17393/90. 14 October 1992; W. v. Ireland. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 9360/81. 28 February
1983; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 61498/08. 30 June
2009 (adm); Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27021/08. 7 July 2011;
J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007.
121

Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 61498/08. 30 June
2009 (adm). See further the House of Lords decision in Al-Skeini and others v. Secretary of State for Defence. House
of Lords. UKHL 26. 13 June 2006 and Hess v. the United Kingdom, European Commission of Human Rights, Appl.
No. 6231/73, 28 May 1975, Decisions & Reports vol. 2, p. 72.
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facto control exercised over the individuals concerned.122 This focus on the exercise of control
as a means of establishing human rights jurisdiction can perhaps be seen most clearly in cases
involving state agents forcibly apprehending and transporting an individual to their state’s
territory.123 Courts have emphasized that the logic of finding jurisdiction in such a situation is
the importance of avoiding a human rights vacuum, since it would be “unconscionable…to
permit a State party to perpetrate violations of [human rights] in the territory of another State,
which violations it could not perpetrate within its own territory.”124 Thus, as observed in AlSkeini, jurisdiction may arise solely from “the exercise of physical power and control over the
person in question.”125

Applying this understanding of jurisdiction to the context of non-entrée policies,
jurisdiction is established when refugees are intercepted and their movements controlled by state

122

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011,
par. 136; Medvedyev and Others v. France. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 3394/03. 29 March 2010,
par. 65.
123

See e.g. López Burgos v. Uruguay. Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. A/36/40. 6 June 1979; Lilian Celiberti
de Casariego v. Uruguay. Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1. 29 July 1981; Freda v Italy.
European Commission on Human Rights. 8916/80. 7 October 1980; Reinette v. France. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. No. 14009/88. 2 October 1989; Stocke v. Germany. European Court of Human Rights. Series A, No.
199. 19 March 1991; Ramirez Sánchez v France. European Commission of Human Rights. Appl. No. 28780/95. 24
June 1996; Öcalan v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 46221/99. 12 March 2003.
124

López Burgos v. Uruguay. Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. A/36/40. 6 June 1979, par. 12.3; Issa and Others
v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 31821/96. 16 November 2004, par. 71.
125

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011,
par. 136. Most cases to date have involved situations of full physical custody by way of arrest or kidnapping. In
Al-Saadoon, for example, the Court emphasized “the total and exclusive” control exercised by the United Kingdom
over the military bases in Iraq: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl.
No. 61498/08. 30 June 2009, par. 88.
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agents acting outside their country.126 A Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights ruled in Hirsi that Italy had jurisdiction over migrants turned back on the high seas under
the auspices of its cooperation agreement with Libya, and that characterizing such interception
as a “rescue operation[] on the high seas”127 was legally irrelevant:

The Court observes that in the instant case the events took place
entirely on board ships of the Italian armed forces, the crews of which
were composed exclusively of Italian military personnel. In the
Court’s opinion, in the period between boarding the ships of the
Italian armed forces and being handed over to the Libyan authorities,
the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de
facto control of the Italian authorities. Speculation as to the nature
and purpose of the intervention of the Italian ships on the high seas
would not lead the Court to any other conclusion.128

Given the lack of protection for refugees in Libya and the risk of persecution in the applicants’
countries of origin (Eritrea and Somalia), the Court found Italy in breach of its human rights
obligations, including the duty of non-refoulement.129

Indeed, jurisdiction may continue where interception leads to the transfer of
refugee claimants to a detention or similar facility located outside the territory of the intercepting

126

See e.g. Ramirez Sánchez v France. European Commission of Human Rights. Appl. No. 28780/95. 24 June
1996; Öcalan v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 46221/99. 12 March 2003; López Burgos v.
Uruguay. Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. A/36/40. 6 June 1979; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay.
Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1. 29 July 1981.
127

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012, par.

79.
128

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012, par.

81.
129

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012,
paras. 122-38, 146-158 and 183-86.
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state.130 In the Marine I case,131 the Committee Against Torture was called upon to consider
Spain’s human rights liability stemming from the rescue of some 369 Asians and Africans in
waters off the West African coast. After boarding the Marine I to provide emergency health
care, Spanish authorities towed the vessel to the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou where the
passengers were disembarked and placed at a former fishing plant under Spanish authority.
Most were repatriated, though 23 persons who resisted repatriation remained at the fishing plant
guarded by Spanish security forces for five months under conditions alleged to be rightsviolative.132 The Committee Against Torture concluded that Spain exercised jurisdiction both
during the interception and throughout the detention in Mauritania noting that

... jurisdiction must also include situations where a State party
exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over
persons in detention…In the present case, ... the State party
maintained control over all persons on board the Marine I from the
time the vessel was rescued and throughout the identification and
repatriation process that took place at Nouadhibou. In particular, the
State party exercised, by virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded
with Mauritania, constant de facto control over the alleged victims
during their detention in Nouadhibou. Consequently, the Committee
considers that the alleged victims are subject to Spanish jurisdiction
insofar as the complaint that forms the subject of the present
communication is concerned.133

130

Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 61498/08. 30 June
2009, par. 88.
131

J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007.

132

Ten of the 23 were eventually granted access to Spain and Portugal and the final thirteen returned to Pakistan.

133

J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007, Par. 8(2). The case

was however declared inadmissible as the complainant was not expressly authorised to act on behalf of the victims.
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Beyond its value as a clear affirmation that an intercepting state retains jurisdiction
even when its control over persons is exercised on the territory of another country, the Marine I
case makes a more general point: namely, that jurisdiction can be established under the control
or authority principle where detention is effected on an indirect basis:

... [T]he jurisdiction of a State party refers to any territory in which it
exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de
facto effective control, in accordance with international law. In
particular... such jurisdiction must also include situations where a
State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control
over persons in detention.134

It follows that a country exercises jurisdiction over refugees when its vessels block or “escort” a
ship carrying refugees, since those refugees are indirectly detained (that is, “confine[d] within a
narrowly bounded or restricted location”135). At least where the blocking or escorting is more
than momentary – as will be the case for reasons of efficacy in most non-entrée scenarios – there
is little doubt that control over the human beings onboard is as real in such cases as it is when
freedom of movement is constrained by the act of actually boarding.136 Indeed, in Xhavara, the
European Court of Human Rights found human rights jurisdiction to exist when an Italian navy
ship seeking to deter migrants on the high seas collided with another vessel, leading to 58

134

J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007, Para. 8(2).

135

UNHCR, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and
Alternatives to Detention, 2012, at Guideline 1.
136

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has similarly determined that the shooting down of an
aircraft in international airspace near Cuba’s borders was sufficient to trigger Cuba’s human rights jurisdiction:
Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba (‘Brothers to the Rescue’), Inter-AmericanCommission for Human
Rights, Case 11.589, 29 September 1999, par. 25.
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deaths137 – a poignant example of the salience of the Committee Against Torture’s insistence that
“indirect” control may be just as effective as direct control.138

In sum, it is clear that territorial control – while sufficient – is no longer required to
establish human rights jurisdiction. Jurisdiction also exists where refugees are intercepted and
their movements controlled by state agents acting outside their country’s territory, including
when those agents continue to exercise control over them in a detention facility in another
country. There is also human rights jurisdiction where extraterritorial control is indirect, as in
the case of blockades and forcibly escorting of vessels carrying asylum seekers on the high seas.
In each of these ways, the modern understanding of human rights jurisdiction is clearly a
powerful means to challenge the common assumption underlying non-entrée policies that core
refugee protection responsibilities apply rarely, if ever, outside their own territory.

B. Exercise of public powers

Jurisdiction will most readily be established on the basis of either territorial or
personal control. As explained in the preceding subsection, the personal control jurisprudence is

137

Xhavara and fifteen v. Italy and Albania, European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 39473/98. 11 January
2001 (Admissibility).
138

Indeed, a number of recent cases suggest that human rights jurisdiction may be established even when there is no
evidence of ongoing direct or indirect control. Contrary to the view taken in Bankovic, recent decisions suggest that
human rights jurisdiction may be established on the basis of what amounts to the effects of rights-violative conduct
lacking any element of durable control. See eg. Georgia Andreou v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights.
Appl. No. 45653/99. 3 June 2008 (Admissibility), p. 11; Isaak and Others v. Turkey. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. No. 44587/98. 28 September 2006 (admissibility); Solomou v. Turkey. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. No. 36832/97. 24 June 2008 (merits); Pad and Others v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights.
Appl. No. 60167/00. 28 June 2007.
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an especially valuable means of challenging some critical forms of cooperation-based non-entrée
under which the role of the extraterritorial state in interdiction or enforcement can be
characterized as amounting to de facto control over the refugees themselves. But what if the
degree of control exercised by the sponsoring state falls short of what is required to establish
jurisdiction under the personal control approach? In particular, what if non-entrée is
implemented by proxy, for example where the sponsoring state deploys officials to work with
authorities in a country of origin or transit to advise them on how best to block refugee
departures?

Recent case law suggests that in addition to the territorial and personal control
bases for establishing jurisdiction, states may also be found to have jurisdiction where they
exercise public powers abroad. In Al-Skeini, the key question was whether the United Kingdom
had jurisdiction over civilians killed in the course of security operations by British soldiers in
Basrah.139 Rather than determining the issue of responsibility simply by reference to either
territorial or personal control, the European Court of Human Rights instead observed that

... the Court has recognised the exercise of extra-territorial
jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, through the consent,
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it
exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised
by that Government... Thus where, in accordance with custom, treaty
or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out
executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the
Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of [international
law] thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable

139

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011,
paras. 102, 130-150.
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to it rather than to the territorial State... 140

In other words, where states are entitled to exercise public powers abroad, jurisdiction for human
rights purposes will follow under certain circumstances. Three requirements must be met.

First, the legal authority of the extraterritorial state to act must be established in
“accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement.”141 Excluded therefore are situations such
as an unlawful invasion in which public powers are effectively usurped by the foreign state.
This constraint is, however, unlikely to be of any real moment in relation to cooperation-based
non-entrée policies, routinely implemented through interstate arrangements. Because some
“other agreement” falling short of custom or treaty suffices, even relatively informal agreements
– memoranda of understanding, an exchange of letters – are enough to show the requisite
consent. Indeed, even the absence of an effective government in the territorial state with which
agreement may be reached is not necessarily fatal, since the facts of Al-Skeini itself suggest that
the legal basis for the exercise of public powers may be derived from international legal
authorization, eg. in the form of a UN resolution.142

Second, the activities undertaken must be fairly characterized as a “public power
normally to be exercised by that Government.”143 The notion of public power is not well-defined

140

Ibid., par. 135.

141

Ibid., par. 135.

142

Ibid., par. 144.

143

Ibid., par. 135.
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in international law, and may thus give rise to disagreement in some cases. But since the court
in Al-Skeini made clear that “public powers” include not just security or civil administration, but
also executive and judicial functions,144 there can be little doubt that the exercise of migration
control – being a core law enforcement task and exclusive sovereign prerogative – constitutes a
public power.145

Third, the breach of human rights resulting from the exercise of public powers
must be attributable to the extraterritorially acting state, rather than to the territorial state.146 The
real link required is, of course, readily established where the sponsoring state has actually
deployed officers or vessels engaged directly in enforcement. But under general principles of
international law conduct is also attributable to a sponsoring state where private actors or third
state authorities act under the direction and control of the sponsoring state,147 or where effective
control is retained over officials otherwise carrying out migration control as part of an

144

Ibid., paras. 135, 143-48.

145

As Emmerich de Vattel notes in the Law of Nations, every sovereign nation retains the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit
them only in such cases or upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations
(Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1883), bk. 2, par. 94, 100. This is fully consistent with current state
practice. See e.g. European Roma Rights Centre and others v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another.
House of Lords. UKHL 55. 9 December 2004, par. 45; Sale, Acting Cmmr, Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Haitian Center Council. United States Supreme Court. 509 U.S. 155 at 199.
146

Al-Skeini, par. 135.

147

2001 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, Art. 8 and 17 respectively.
Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. International Court of Justice. ICJ
Reports 1986. 27 June 1986. For a general discussion of the relevant test for attributing non-state and third state
conduct, see James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), pp. 126-32, 146-61.
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international organization.148

Given the consonance between the three requirements for jurisdiction based on the
exercise of public powers and the nature of many cooperation-based non-entrée practices, this
emerging line of jurisprudence is an important addition to the more established approaches
grounded in territorial or personal control. Even where there is no territorial or personal control,
the fact that the sponsoring state can be said to exercise migration control functions beyond its
borders – an increasingly common phenomenon – will often suffice to establish jurisdiction
despite formal assertions to the contrary.

Under EU law, for example, the RABIT (“rapid border intervention teams”)
Regulation posits that any responsibility stemming from operations conducted by the EU border
control agency, Frontex, with partner states rests solely with the partner states.149 Yet in
substance, the Regulation undoubtedly establishes a clear entitlement of officials of EU states
seconded to Frontex to exercise public powers in that they not only work in their national
uniforms, but “shall have the capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border
checks or border surveillance” in line with the Schengen Borders Code.150 Although formally
required to patrol only in the company of an officer of the host country and to act only on the

148

ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, Art. 7; Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom.
European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27021/08. 7 July 2011, par. 80. Crawford, State Responsibility, pp.
422-34.
149

Regulation (EC) No 863/2007, Establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams,
11 July 2007, Art. 10.
150

Ibid., Art. 6(3).
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instructions of the host state, Frontex officers deployed to Greece have in practice independently
carried out patrols and intercepted and interviewed refugees and other migrants.151 Despite
Greece’s theoretical responsibility to decide the issue of return or admission to an asylum
procedure, there is little doubt that in practice the dysfunctional Greek asylum system –
determined by both the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice to fall
below even minimal international standards of efficacy152 – relies significantly on the efforts of
officials from other EU states. In these circumstances, the public powers approach to
jurisdiction affords a sound basis to argue that these other states may exercise jurisdiction by
their deterrent actions, and should therefore be held accountable for any breach of refugee or
other international law following from that exercise of public powers.

To be clear, we do not argue that liability for breach of human rights law ought to
hinge exclusively on the permissibility of a state’s actions.153 But it is important not to conflate
151

Human Rights Watch, ’ The EU's Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in
Greece’, 21 September 2011.
152

MSS v. Belgium and Greece. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 30696/09. 21 January 2011. N. S. (C
411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and others v. Refugee Applications
Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform , C-411/10 and C-493/10, European Union: Court of
Justice of the European Union, 21 December 2011. See further Human Rights Watch, ’ The EU's Dirty Hands:
Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece’, 21 September 2011. In June 2014, the
Committee of Ministers decided to continue supervision of Greece based on a finding that the asylum system is still
not fully compliant with the European Convention of Human Rights. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers,
Decision in Case 4 against Belgium and Greece (M.S.S.). 1201 st Meeting, 5 June 2014.

153

Milanovic has championed the view that “consent or the sovereignty of the territorial state more generally should
be entirely irrelevant for the issue of extraterritorial application [of human rights]”: Marko Milanovic, 'Al-Skeini and
Al-Jedda in Strasbourg' (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 121-139 at 132. Or as Scheinin puts it,
‘facticity creates normativity’, Martin Scheinin, 'Extraterritorial effect of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights', in Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights
Treaties (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004), pp. 73-82 at 75. It is well-established that extraterritorial jurisdiction may be
triggered solely based on the degree of de facto control. See e.g. López Burgos v. Uruguay. Human Rights
Committee. UN Doc. A/36/40. 6 June 1979, par. 12.3 and the separate opinion by Christian Tomuschat and Öcalan
v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 46221/99. 12 March 2003. See further Martin Heijer, Europe
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this position with the view that the exercise of public powers should not be seen to be an
additional basis to find jurisdiction (beyond territory and personal authority). Our argument is in
no way that human rights responsibility should be limited by formal notions of sovereignty, but
rather that legal entitlement to act extraterritorially as a matter of public international law fairly
defines a (not “the”) circumstance in which jurisdiction exists, and that accountability for human
rights violations is enhanced by acknowledging this additional basis to hold states responsible
for breach of relevant norms.

The continued alignment of human rights law and public international law more
generally on the issue of jurisdiction is in our view not only doctrinally sound – international
human rights law is, after all, a subset of public international law – but is also strategically
wise.154 The interaction between the two bodies of law has often been quite positive,155 affirming
for example that jurisdiction may flow from either de facto or de jure control.156 And the human

and Extraterritorial Asylum (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p. 33.
154

We suspect that the antagonism towards reliance on a public powers approach to jurisdiction stems less from its
substance than from the fact that it is a notion grounded in public international law more generally. In the aftermath
of what many scholars understandably believed to be the wrong-headed approach to jurisdiction taken in Bankovic –
an approach allegedly grounded in public international law – we see an unhealthy willingness to throw the proverbial
baby out with the bathwater. Put simply, it does not follow that because Bankovic was arguably an incorrect
decision on jurisdiction grounded in public international law that any approach to jurisdiction grounded in public
international law should be regarded with skepticism.
155

Loukis Loucaides, 'Determining the Extra-territorial Effect of the European Convention: Facts, Jurisprudence
and the Bankovic Case' (2006) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 391-407 at 393-94; Hugh King, 'The
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States' (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521-556.
156

J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007, par. 8(2), cited above.
Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 52207/99. 12 December
2001, par. 73, and Medvedyev and Others v. France. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 3394/03. 29
March 2010, par. 65. The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has similarly distinguished between
‘jurisdiction’ and ‘de facto jurisdiction’. Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba ("Brothers to the Rescue").
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99, Annual Report IACHR 1999, 586.
29 September 1999, par. 23, fn 14, citing Theodor Meron, 'Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties' (1995) 89
American Journal of International Law 78-82 at 81. Hirsi, par. 80, citing Medvedyev.
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rights value of the public powers approach to jurisdiction is clear not only from the result in AlSkeini157 itself, but also, for example, from such decisions as X and Y v. Switzerland 158(in which
an immigrant denied entry into Liechtenstein was held to be subject to Swiss jurisdiction
because Switzerland legislated on immigration matters for both territories) and J.H.A. v. Spain 159
(in which Spain was found to have retained jurisdiction during the period the migrants were
detained in Nouadhibou “by virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with Mauritania”).

We thus believe that reliance on the public powers approach to the definition of an
additional basis of jurisdiction has the potential to serve as an important tool in the fight against
cooperative variants of non-entrée, allowing liability to be imposed in a number of
circumstances that arguably fall outside either the territorial or the personal mode of jurisdiction.
Where there is an agreement to deploy liaison officers or provide other forms of support that in
substance result in the exercise of effective control by the sponsoring state, jurisdiction – and
hence liability – is established.

IV. Shared jurisdiction

To this point we have established that responsibility for refoulement follows from
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction can be established when states exercise effective control over

157

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 55721/07. 7 July 2011,
par. 135.
158

X and Y v. Switzerland. European Commission of Human Rights. Appl. No. 7289/75 and 7349/76. 14 July 1977.

159

J.H.A v. Spain. Committee Against Torture. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007. 21 November 2007, par. 8(2), cited above.
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territory, authority over individuals, or public powers under international law. But what of the
situation in which more than one state can be said to have jurisdiction and hence incur human
rights responsibility? Effective control over territory is normally exclusive, but neither authority
over individuals nor the exercise of public powers necessarily preempts the simultaneous
jurisdiction of a territorial or cooperating state. Can the state acting extraterritorially be held to
exercise jurisdiction in the case of such non-exclusivity?

The traditional view in human rights law was that jurisdiction was an all or nothing
proposition.160 Since jurisdiction was the basis for responsibility, it followed that shared
responsibility for the breach of human rights obligations would be implausible. Under this
classic approach, the developments in the law of jurisdiction set out in Part III would have had
little practical value in contesting cooperation-based forms of non-entrée, as the jurisdiction of
the territorial state would ordinarily have been thought to trump a more diffuse form of
jurisdiction.161

Modern understandings of jurisdiction under human rights law have, however,
largely rejected this “all or nothing” view and come more closely into line with the dominant
position in public international law that two or more states responsible for the same
internationally wrongful act can both be held individually liable on the basis of their own

160

In Ilse Hess v. United Kingdom the European Commission thus refused to single out the responsibility of the
United Kingdom as one of the four powers exercising authority over the Spandau Prison in Berlin. Ilse Hess v.
United Kingdom. European Commission of Human Rights. Appl. No. 6231/73. 2 DR (1975-76) 72.
161

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, pp. 145-49.
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conduct and international obligations.162 In other words, the fact that several states have
jurisdiction does not diminish the individual responsibility of any particular state.163 This
bedrock principle of public international law can be seen, for example, in the reasoning of the
International Court of Justice in the Certain Phosphate Lands case.164 The Court there rejected
the Australian argument that a finding of individuated liability against it was foreclosed by the
fact that its trusteeship of Nauru was shared with New Zealand and the United Kingdom:

Australia has raised the question whether the liability of the three
States would be “joint and several” (solidaire), so that any one of the
three would be liable to make full reparation for damage flowing
from any breach of the obligations of the Administering Authority,
and not merely a one-third or some other proportionate share. This ...
is independent of the question whether Australia can be sued alone.
The Court does not consider that any reason has been shown why a
claim brought against only one of the three States should be declared
inadmissible in limine litis merely because that claim raises questions
of the administration of the Territory, which was shared with two
other States. It cannot be denied that Australia had obligations under

162

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), Art.
47; James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.
333-34. Nollkaemper, André, and Dov Jacobs. 2011. Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper.
ACIL Research Paper No 2011-07 (SHARES Series). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, p. 15. There were
limited historical examples of two or more states sharing territorial jurisdiction, eg. condominium or trusteeships.
See eg. Turpin, James. 2002. The Jurisdictional Art of Separation: the role of jurisdiction in the management of
territorial and self-determination disputes - mixed jurisdiction in the Anglo-French condominium of the new
Hebrides 1906-1980. PhD dissertation. Florence: European University Institute; Nollkaemper, André. 2011. Issues
of Shared Responsibility before the International Court of Justice. ACIL Research Paper No 2011-01 (SHARES
Series). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam; Crawford, State Responsibility, pp. 325-28.
163

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 47(1). James Crawford,
State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 334-35. See generally
V. Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’, in M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), pp. 335-360; F. Berman, ‘Jurisdiction: The State’, in P. Capps, M. D. Evans and S. Konstadinidis (eds.),
Asserting Jurisdiction (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 2-15; R. T. Ford, ‘Law’s Territory (A History of
Jurisdiction)’ (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 843-930; J. G. Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing
Modernity in International Relations’ (1993) 47 International Organization 139-174 at 151; Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Access to Asylum, ch. 4.5.
164

Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections. International Court of Justice,
26 June 1992; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia). International Court of Justice. ICJ Reports 1995. 30 June 1995;
Corfu Channel Case. International Court of Justice. ICJ Reports 1949. 9 April 1949.
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the Trusteeship Agreement, in its capacity as one of the three States
forming the Administering Authority, and there is nothing in the
character of that Agreement which debars the Court from considering
a claim of a breach of those obligations by Australia.165

In line with this approach, the human rights cases of Al-Skeini and Hirsi expressly
rejected an “all or nothing” approach, finding that “rights can be divided and tailored.”166 Thus,
for example, in Ilascu the European Court of Human Rights held that both Moldova and Russia
had exercised jurisdiction – Russia due to its decisive influence over the local Transnistrian
regime, Moldova through its de jure sovereignty over the area – and held that simultaneous yet
differentiated human rights responsibility followed.167 The same principle has been found to
apply where distinct actions by more than one state result in a common harm, as is clear from the
ruling in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece determining that Belgium was in breach for returning the
applicant to Greece contrary to the duty of non-refoulement, even as it found that Greece was
itself liable for the failure to establish adequate asylum procedures and to avoid the ill-treatment
of those seeking its protection.168

Importantly, particularized liability may ensue even when not all of the states
exercising jurisdiction are bound by the same international legal obligations. In Al-Skeini, the
United Kingdom was held responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights even
165

Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections. International Court of Justice,
26 June 1992, par. 48.

166

Al-Skeini, par. 137; Hirsi, par. 74.

167

Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 48787/99 . 8 July 2004.
See also Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 12747/87. 26 June
1992, paras. 91-96.
168

M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 30696/09. 21 January 2011.
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though it shared its jurisdiction in Iraq with the United States and other non-party states making
up the Coalition Provisional Authority following the removal of the Ba’ath regime.169 Similarly,
the active assistance of Kenyan authorities in the arrest of the PKK leader in Nairobi was
considered in Öcalan, yet this did not detract from a finding of Turkish jurisdiction for purposes
of the European Convention once Turkish authorities took him into custody.170 Under this
understanding, the fact that a partner state is not a party to the Refugee Convention (as is
frequently the case under cooperation-based forms of non-entrée) is no bar to finding the
sponsoring state party exercising jurisdiction to be liable.

Nor does it matter whether shared jurisdiction exists directly among the states in
question or is achieved by the delegation of authority to an agency or organ.171 In T.I. v. United
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights determined that

[w]here States establish international organizations, or mutatis
mutandis international agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain
fields of activities, there may be implications for the protection of
fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and
object of the Convention if Contracting States were thereby absolved
from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field
of activity covered by such attribution.172

169

Al-Skeini, paras. 144-50.

170

Öcalan v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 46221/99. 12 March 2003, par. 93.

171

ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 47 and comments p.
125. This is corroborated by the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc.
A/66/10 (2011), Arts. 58-62 and commentaries pp. 89-90. See more generally James Crawford, State Responsibility:
The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 343-54.

172

T.I. v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 43844/98. 7 March 2000 (Admissibility),
p. 15.
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Because legal liability is not avoided when authority is delegated to an international
organization,173 patrols conducted under the auspices of such entities as the European Union’s
Frontex agency may still engage the liability of each participating state whose officials or agents
have taken part in an action that gives rise to jurisdiction, and which leads to refoulement or
another human rights breach. As much is impliedly recognized by the regulation defining the
authority of Frontex, which provides that “[t]he responsibility for the control and surveillance of
external borders lies with the Member States.”174

In sum, evolution of the notion of shared jurisdiction allowing more than one state
to be held liable for a given breach of human rights as a function of its own actions, whatever the
liability of other states, is an important bulwark against cooperation-based forms of non-entrée
that purport to leave partner states holding the ball for the refoulement of refugees. As the
European Court of Human Rights noted succinctly in Xhavara, the “Italian-Albanian Agreement
cannot, by itself, engage the responsibility of [Albania] under the Convention for any action
taken by Italian authorities in the implementation of this agreement.”175
173

Matthews v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 24883/94. 19 February 1999, par. 32;
Beer and Regan v. Germany. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 28934/95. 18 February 1999; Bosphorus
Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ticaret Anonim ªirketi v. Ireland. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 45036/98. 30
June 2005. Schutter, Olivier De. 2010. International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
216-38; Sarooshi, Dan. 2005, p. 64 International Organisations and their Exercise of Sovereign Power. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. State responsibility for acts committed by states acting under the authority of the UN
Security Council remains a special case, see Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and
Norway. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 71412/01 and 78166/01. 2 May 2007.

174

Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ, 2004, L349/1
175

Xhavara and fifteen v. Italy and Albania. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 39473/98. 11 January
2001 (admissibility), p. 4 (authors’ own translation of the French text). The European Court of Human Rights further
considered the impact of bilateral agreements in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, in which the United Kingdom argued that
since United Kingdom forces operated in Iraq subject to a memorandum of understanding establishing Iraqi overall
jurisdiction, the United Kingdom was under a legal obligation to transfer the applicants over to the Iraqi authorities
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V. Aiding or assisting

To this point we have shown that many contemporary non-entrée practices can be
successfully challenged by reliance on developments in the law of jurisdiction, especially when
coupled with an appreciation that shared responsibility in law may exist where more than one
state has jurisdiction in a given context. But, what of the situation where the involvement of the
sponsoring state falls short of establishing jurisdiction, even under one of the expanded notions
of jurisdiction described in Part III?176 For example, states are clearly not exercising jurisdiction
when they provide only training or material assistance to a partner state. Even when
immigration officers or other officials are posted to another country as advisers, there will be no
exercise of jurisdiction unless the authorities of the territorial state can be shown to act under the
direction and control of the sponsoring state. Because there is no jurisdiction, does it follow that
the sponsoring country bears no legal responsibility for ensuing harms?

Perhaps not. There is an emerging consensus that international law will hold states

despite a known risk that this might subject the applicants to the death penalty. Recalling the Soering principle that
such a transfer would constitute refoulement, the Court held that ‘a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1
of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no
distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of the Contracting Party’s
“jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention.’ Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom. European Court of
Human Rights. Appl. No. 61498/08. 2 March 2010, par. 128
176

We use the term "shared responsibility" in this paper to indicate a situation in which more than one state has
simultaneous jurisdiction. We note, however, that the term as employed by others may also include aiding or
assisting of the kind considered in this section: See e.g. André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs. 2011. Shared
Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper. ACIL Research Paper No 2011-07 (SHARES Series).
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
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responsible for aiding or assisting another state’s wrongful conduct.177 This understanding is
most clearly set out in Art. 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility:

A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible
for doing so if (a) that State does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act
would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.178

The ILC Articles are not, of course, formally binding. Art. 16 has, however,
garnered wide support as a matter of state practice and opinio juris.179 In the Bosnian Genocide
177

Quigley, John. 1986. Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility.
British Yearbook of International Law 57:77-131; Gibney, Mark, et al. 1999. Transnational State Responsibility for
Violations of Human Rights. Harvard Human Rights Journal 12:267-296; Lowe, Vaughan. 2002. Responsibility for
the Conduct of Other States. Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 101:1-15; Button, Jillian. 2007. Spirited
Away (Into a Legal Black Hole?); The challenge of invoking state responsibility for extraordinary rendition. Florida
Journal of International Law 19 (3):531-67; Nolte, Gregor, and Helmut Philipp Aust. 2009. Equivocal Helpers Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law. International & Comparative Law Quarterly 58:1-30;
Aust, Helmut Philipp. 2011. Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press; James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
178

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001).
Earlier drafts of the ILC Articles equally referred to ‘complicity’ and ‘accessory’ responsibility, ‘aid and assistance’
was eventually chosen as a more neutral-sounding term. Nolte, Gregor, and Helmut Philipp Aust. 2009. Equivocal
Helpers - Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law. International & Comparative Law Quarterly
58:1-30 at 5. As Milanovic has pointed out, ‘aid and assistance’ may be perhaps best be thought of as a particular
kind of complicity, involving a degree of material assistance beyond mere instigation. Milanovic, Marko. 2007. State
Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up. European Journal of International Law 18 (4):669-694 at 682. For an
overview of the drafting history of Art. 16, see Aust, Helmut Philipp. 2011. Complicity and the Law of State
Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 100-103.
179

For a recent attempt to provide an overview in this area, see Aust, Complicity, pp. 107-191. As Aust concludes,
‘the number of positive statements available allows us to ascribe the necessary element of opinio juris to the practice
we have assembled to a degree that is seldom available in international law….[N]ot only can we point to a
significant amount of practice here, but we can underline its legal significance with the amount of support Article 16
ASR has found in the deliberations of States in the United Nations.’ Ibid., p. 186. For further support see Quigley,
John. 1986. Complicity in international law: A new direction in the law of State responsibility. British Yearbook of
International Law 57:77-97; Nolte, Gregor, and Helmut Philipp Aust. 2009. Equivocal Helpers - Complicit States,
Mixed Messages and International Law. International & Comparative Law Quarterly 58:1-30 at 7-10; d'Aspremont,
Jean. 2009. Rebellion and State Responsibility: Wrongdoing by democratically elected insurgents. International &
Comparative Law Quarterly 58:427-42 at 432. Other scholars have remained more cautious, see e.g. Lowe,
Vaughan. 2002. Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States. Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 101:115.
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case, the International Court of Justice drew on Art. 16, noting that it considered the article to be
an expression of customary international law.180 The Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe similarly referred to Art. 16 as applicable to European states contributing to instances of
refoulement and other human rights abuses in the context of the US-led extraordinary rendition
program,181 as did Judge Albuquerque in his separate opinion to the Hirsi case.182 This approach
is very much in line with the general view of the European Court of Human Rights that
international human rights law is to be interpreted taking into account the law on state
responsibility:

Principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and
applied in a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any
relevant rules of international law when examining questions
concerning its jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State
responsibility in conformity with the governing principles of
international law.183

Art. 16 regrettably does not tell us specifically what counts as aiding or assisting
another state to breach its international legal obligations. The commentary notes that the
assistance need not be essential to performing the illegal act, so long as it contributes

180

Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). International Court of Justice. 26 February 2007, par. 420.
181

Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret
Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoner, European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion no. 363 / 2005, 17 March 2006, paras. 44-45.
182

Separate opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012, p. 80
183

Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, and Others. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 52207/99. 12
December 2001, par. 57. Indeed, Art. 5 of the International Law Commissions parallel Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations was recently applied by the European Court of Human Rights in AlJedda to determine the question of attribution between the United Kingdom and the United Nations. Al-Jedda v.
United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27021/08. 7 July 2011, par. 84
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significantly thereto184 – suggesting at the very least that action beyond mere instigation is
required.185 But state responsibility does arise where a state provides “material aid to a State that
uses the aid to commit human rights violations.”186 The International Court of Justice thus
sensibly determined in the Bosnian Genocide case that the supply of weapons, military
equipment and financial resources amounted to “aid and assistance” by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to the army of Republika Srpska.187

In line with these understandings, we believe that a state which takes steps such as
providing maritime patrol vessels or border control equipment, which seconds border officials,
or which shares relevant intelligence or directly funds migration control efforts that assist
another country to breach its non-refoulement or other protection obligations is taking action that
can fairly be characterized as within the ambit of aiding or assisting. We would distinguish such
actions from, for example, merely applying diplomatic pressure to introduce or enforce exit
migration controls or to sign readmission agreements which – while undoubtedly creating a
climate within which rights breaches may occur – are simply too remote from such harms to be
deemed aiding or assisting the commission of a wrongful act.188 Nor do we believe that a pure

184

Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 16,
par. 5.
185

Crawford, State Responsibility, p. 403; Aust, Complicity, p 209; Milanovic, ’State Responsibility’, 682.

186

Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 16,
par. 9.
187

Genocide case, paras. 239-241, 422. This is equally supported by state practice. ILC Commentary, Art. 16, par.
7. See further Nolte and Aust, Complicit States, pp. 7-8.
188

See inter alia R. Byrne, G. Noll, and J. Vedsted-Hansen (eds.), New Asylum Countries? Migration Control and

Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 16.
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act of omission, for example failing to step in to prevent an instance of refoulement by another
state, rises to the level of aiding or assisting that country to breach its obligations.189

Even where the state sponsoring non-entrée takes more direct forms of action, Art.
16 provides that the assisting state must have “knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act.”190 Indeed, the commentary goes farther, suggesting both an
intention and a consummation requirement, namely that aid or assistance must be given “with a
view to facilitating the internationally wrongful act, and must actually do so.”191 It follows that
liability should not follow where aid or assistance given in good faith is subsequently misused by
another country – for example, a state providing development aid is not responsible if,
unbeknownst to it, that aid is used to implement border controls that lead to the refoulement of
refugees.

189

Genocide case, paras. 222-3; Crawford, State Responsibility, pp. 403-5.

190

Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 16.

191

ILC Commentary, Art. 16, par. 5. The interpretation of this requirement has been an issue of some contestation
both within and outside the ILC. On the one hand, it could be taken to imply that the assisting state must share the
wrongful intent of the principal state, effectively narrowing the scope of application. Nolte, Complicity, pp. 230-49;
Milanovic, Marko. 2007. State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up. European Journal of International Law
18 (4):669-694 at 682-84; Nolte and Aust, Complicit States, pp. 14-15. The International Court of Justice raised this
question in the Genocide case, but ultimately left it unanswered: ‘Before the Court turns to an examination of the
facts, one further comment is required. It concerns the link between the specific intent (dolus specialis) which
characterizes the crime of genocide and the motives which inspire the actions of an accomplice (meaning a person
providing aid or assistance to the direct perpetrators of the crime): the question arises whether complicity
presupposes that the accomplice shares the specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator. But whatever
the reply to this question, there is no doubt that the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a
perpetrator of the crime of genocide cannot be treated as complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or
person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal
perpetrator. If that condition is not fulfilled, that is sufficient to exclude categorization as complicity. The Court will
thus first consider whether this latter condition is met in the present case. It is only if it replies to that question of fact
in the affirmative that it will need to determine the legal point referred to above.’ Genocide case, par. 421 .
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It is otherwise, however, where the sponsoring state has at least constructive
knowledge that its contributions will aid or assist another country to breach its obligations and
chooses to aid or assist notwithstanding such constructive knowledge. For example, in Hirsi
Italy argued that it reasonably considered Libya to be a “safe host country” based on its
ratification of several human rights treaties and the African Union’s regional refugee treaty,
coupled with the express stipulation in the Italian-Libyan agreement requiring Libya to comply
with international human rights law.192 Relying on these formal commitments, Italy argued that
it “had no reason to believe that Libya would evade its commitments.”193 This argument was,
however, soundly rejected by the Court:

... [T]he Court is bound to observe that the existence of domestic laws
and the ratification of international treaties guaranteeing respect for
fundamental rights are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate
protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present
case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated
by the authorities...
The Court notes again that [this] situation was well-known and easy
to verify on the basis of multiple sources. It therefore considers that
when the applicants were removed, the Italian authorities knew or
should have known that, as irregular migrants, they would be exposed
in Libya to treatment in breach of the Convention and that they would
not be given any kind of protection in that country.194

The Court’s approach aligns neatly with the general refusal of courts to countenance wilful

192

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 February 2012, par.

97.
193

Ibid., paras 97-98.

194

Ibid., paras 128, 131.
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blindness to readily ascertainable facts.195

Beyond the requirement of knowledge, liability for aiding or assisting can be
imposed only where the act “would be internationally wrongful” if committed by both the
principal state actor and the state said to be aiding or assisting that country.196 The starting point
is therefore to ascertain that the conduct in question is in breach of an international obligation of
the principal state – not a minor matter when, as is often the case, non-entrée cooperation is
undertaken with a state that is not bound the by Refugee Convention or Protocol, including such
key partner states as Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia.197 Some would no doubt locate the
required unlawfulness in the alleged existence of a customary legal duty of non-refoulement.198
In our view, the better approach would be to draw on Crawford’s view that Art. 16(b) “merely
requires that the conduct in question would have been internationally wrongful if committed by
the assisting state and says nothing about the identity of norms or sources”199 – thus opening the
possibility of liability for aiding or assisting where the act in question is unlawful for both the

195

See, inter alia, Aust, Complicity, pp. 244-49; Brownlie, Ian. 1983. State Responsibility. System of the Law of
Nations, Part 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 12. This would align the knowledge requirement for complicity with
that ordinarily applied in the context of non-refoulement. But see Crawford, State Responsibility, p. 406.
196

This is a reflection of the pacta tertii principle that no state is bound by the obligations of another state vis-á-vis
third states. 1969 Vienna Convention Relating to the Interpretation of Treaties Arts. 34 and 35.
197

Cf. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 'The Externalisation of European Migration Control and the Reach of

International Refugee Law', in Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud (eds.), The First Decade of EU Migration and
Asylum Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 273-98.
198

But see James Hathaway, “Leveraging Asylum.” Texas International Law Journal 45 (3):503-36, arguing that
the relatively consistent state practice required for a customary norm of non-refoulement to come into being does not
in fact exist.
199

Crawford, State Responsibility, p. 410.
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principal and sponsoring states, albeit on the basis of distinct legal norms.200 Many partner states
not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol are nonetheless parties to other human rights
instruments that contain a cognate duty of non-refoulement (though the scope of same may not in
all cases be identical)201 – thus providing the required basis for a finding of international
wrongfulness. For example, Libya and Indonesia have both ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (which has been interpreted to impose a duty of non-refoulement at
least in cases involving risk of the breach of Arts. 6 and 7202) as well as the Convention Against
Torture (which proscribes return to torture in Art. 3203). Indeed, it may even be that it would be
“internationally wrongful” for a partner state to breach the terms of an international non-entrée
cooperation agreements – which often condition such cooperation on respect for refugee and
other rights.

It remains, however, that the scope of the duty not to aid or assist another country
to breach international law is not yet as fully developed in international human rights law as are
the evolutions in regard to both jurisdiction and shared responsibility described in Parts III and
IV. There is nonetheless little doubt that a general rule of state responsibility for complicity or
“aiding and assisting” is now accepted as a matter of principle even as its contours await full

200

Notably, the International Court of Justice, when considering that Art. 16 could be applied analogous to state
complicity under the Genocide Convention, did not consider the equal obligations requirement to be essential since
the Bosnian Serb forces committing the genocide did not constitute a state. Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro). International Court of Justice. 26 February 2007.
201

Supra, fns. 4, 93.

202

Human Rights Committee, General Comment to Art. 7 20/44, par. 9.

203

Brian Gorlick, ‘The Convention and the Committee against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime for
Refugees’ (1999) International Journal of Refugee Law 11(3), 479-495.
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elucidation.204 States that believe that the more diffuse forms of non-entrée involving no
exercise of jurisdiction are thus necessarily immune from legal liability are thus proceeding with
false confidence.

Conclusions

We have argued here that developed states have what might charitably be called a
schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee law. On the one hand, wealthier states no
longer garner the sorts of direct benefit from the refugee law regime that they did in its early
years – when it assisted them to cope with mass influxes or to vindicate strategic political values
by “admitting the enemies of their enemies.” But powerful states still wish to be seen to be
committed to the refugee law regime, most importantly in our view because staying involved
with refugee law is critical to being seen to stand in solidarity with states of the less developed
world where most refugees now stay. If the developed world were to withdraw entirely from
refugee law, the poorer states that today do the lion’s share of work under the regime might well
follow suit – with deleterious consequences for both interstate security and economic well-being,
and a near certainty that more refugees would be compelled to seek protection in the developed
world.

204

Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). International Court of Justice. 26 February 2007, par. 173;
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion.
International Court of Justice. General List No. 131. 9 July 2004, par. 146; Quigley, John. 1986. Complicity in
international law: A new direction in the law of State responsibility. British Yearbook of International Law 57:77-97;
Nolte, Gregor, and Helmut Philipp Aust. 2009. Equivocal Helpers - Complicit States, Mixed Messages and
International Law. International & Comparative Law Quarterly 58:1-30; d'Aspremont, Jean. 2009. Rebellion and
State Responsibility: Wrongdoing by democratically elected insurgents. International & Comparative Law
Quarterly 58:427-42 at 432; Aust, Complicity, p. 191.
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The result of this schizophrenia has been the politics of non-entrée, comprising
efforts to keep refugees away from wealthy states without formally resiling from treaty
obligations. As the early generation of non-entrée practices – visa controls and carrier sanctions,
the establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence – has proved increasingly
vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate
cooperation have emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the home or a
transit state, or at least in their territory. As we have shown, this new generation of non-entrée
comprises a range of practices from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint migration
control operations. The critical question we address here is whether such cooperation-based
mechanisms of non-entrée are – as developed states seem to believe – capable of insulating them
from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not.

We believe that three evolving areas of international law – jurisdiction, shared
responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting – are likely to stymie many if not all of the
new forms of non-entrée. The fact that jurisdiction, and hence liability, is now understood to
flow not just from territory, but also from authority over individuals in areas beyond a state’s
jurisdiction and indeed from the exercise of public powers abroad, has dramatically expanded
the scope of accountability for core refugee law and related human rights obligations. Nor are
we any longer hampered by the view that only one state may be held liable for the violation of
human rights to which more than one country contributed: to the contrary, the “all or nothing”
optic has now given way to the view that particularized liability may ensue, and may ensue even
when not all states concerned are bound by the same obligations. And even when no case can be
made for the exercise of jurisdiction under even its modern incarnations, the emerging law on
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liability for aiding or assisting another state to breach its duties under international law has
enormous potential to close the accountability gaps that the new generation of non-entrée
practices seek to exploit.

Perhaps most intriguing, it seems clear that these contemporary understandings of
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting are most likely to be
effective in contesting precisely the variants of the new non-entrée that appeal most to developed
countries. While legal liability is least clear where the sponsoring state engages in only
diplomatic outreach, the provision of financial incentives, or training of personnel or provision
of equipment, these options are increasingly viewed by developed countries as unattractive given
the inherent uncertainties about whether there will be a solid and dependable deterrent return.
The inclination to become more directly involved in order to achieve more control and thereby to
increase the likelihood of efficacy thus often pushes states to the more interventionist end of the
spectrum of contemporary non-entrée. Yet it is when a state’s own personnel are deployed in
aid of deterrence abroad or where joint or shared enforcement is established that legal liability
becomes most clear.

Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency of non-entrée
mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we
believe probable, the preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges are
likely to prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to serve a critical role in provoking a
frank conversation about how to replace the duplicitous politics of non-entrée with a system
predicated on the meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection
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around the world.205 Because it would be protection rather than unlawful deterrence that is being
shared under such a regime, no issue of illegality would arise. Such a system could deliver to
powerful states the manageability they so keenly seek, but do so in a way that ensures – rather
than avoids – the needs and legitimate aspirations of both refugees and the poorer states that host
them.

205

See in particular J. Hathaway and R. A. Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal
for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 10 (Spring 1997),
155–169, 173–187.
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